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1 Changes at Work
Life grants nothing to us 
mortals without hard work.
 Horace, Satires
As the cornerstone of civilized society, there was little 
reason in centuries past to question either the nature or the 
future of work. From Biblical times well into the 20th cen 
tury, work was intimately linked to both individual and col 
lective survival, a necessity of life which required no explana 
tion. Occasionally an author paused to examine the hard 
ships of common laborers, but never with the expectation 
that their lot could be changed. Even if a handful were for 
tunate enough to enjoy a life of leisure, the prospect of a 
society in which many individuals were freed from work was 
beyond imagination for all but the most recent generations.
When earlier writers did turn their attention to the institu 
tion of work, it was usually in fear of some dwindling com 
mitment to work which might threaten national survival and 
progress. As Sigmund Freud suggested, "After primal man 
had discovered that it lay in his own hands, literally, to im 
prove his lot on earth by working, it cannot have been a mat 
ter of indifference whether another man worked." 1 Thus, in 
both religious and secular literature the virtues of dedication 
and hard work were repeatedly extolled. In early American 
history, these themes are easily traced Benjamin Franklin 
lamented that working days were being wasted "expensively
at the ale house," and nearly a century later Abraham Lin 
coln still viewed the desire to work as "so rare a want that it 
should be encouraged." These comments reflected popular 
views of prior generations, in which the nation was por 
trayed as teetering on the brink of economic and moral 
decline due to a widespread aversion to work.
The unprecedented economic growth and affluence during 
the three decades following World War II has begun to alter 
the way we view work in modern societies. In many ways, 
work no longer has the obvious role or significance which it 
carried for our predecessors, if only because each 
individual's labor is no longer essential for societal or even 
personal sustenance. All but a tiny part of the workforce in 
1900 was working to produce the goods necessary for com 
mon survival, but now more than six of every ten workers 
have no hand in these activities. We now have more 
cosmetologists than plumbers, more social workers than 
brickmasons, and more professors than coal miners. Our 
range of work options is broader than ever before, and at 
least collectively we have been freed from the constant strug 
gle for survival. In this sense, work increasingly represents 
our will rather than our curse.
Modern Fears and Hopes
As we move ever further away from the direct production 
of goods, the option of changing work or abandoning it 
completely becomes more significant. Inevitably, it seems 
less clear why we work, and so the traditional fears of a deca 
dent society that values leisure more than work persist. Yet 
in a more optimistic vein, this new freedom makes us wonder 
how our jobs might be reshaped in response to more lofty 
goals and needs. Thus, for perhaps the first time, we have 
become concerned not only with our motivation or will 
ingness to work but also with our satisfaction at the 
workplace.
Those who perceive work as integrally related to social 
stability continue to view the weakening ties between work 
and survival with alarm. For example, David Riesman 
argued that the expansion of leisure "threatens to push work 
itself closer to the fringes of consciousness and 
significance." 2 Daniel Bell views current trends in leisure and 
affluence as undermining the Protestant work ethic, 3 and 
Christopher Lasch also contends that Americans identify 
"not with the work ethic but with the ethic of leisure, 
hedonism, and self-fulfillment." 4 Such predictions of work's 
demise are seldom dispassionate more typical is Arthur 
Schlesinger's warning that "the most dangerous threat hang 
ing over American society is the threat of leisure." 5 The fear 
of a decaying work ethic is so pervasive that the federal 
Department of Commerce initiated in the 1970s an advertis 
ing campaign to bolster an allegedly weakening commitment 
to work.
Of course, even if one accepts the premise that the will to 
work is eroding, the vision of the future which follows 
depends largely on one's view of human nature. Utopian 
forecasters rely on the same presumed trend toward a 
workless society which prophets of doom project, but these 
more optimistic observers view leisure as a stimulus rather 
than a threat to societal advancement. For those who see 
leisure as enhancing human development, technology 
becomes a panacea which frees individuals from the necessi 
ty of work without sacrificing gains in economic well-being. 
One may question the underlying view of a world without 
work, but such an eventuality would no doubt offer oppor 
tunities as well as dangers.
Analysts of work quality and worker satisfaction usually 
do not stretch recent gains in leisure into projections of a 
workless society, but they are often guilty of other excesses. 
In contrast to the image of technology as the great liberator 
from work, technological change is frequently portrayed as 
necessarily eliminating skilled work roles and reducing pros 
pects for personal satisfaction at the workplace. Claims of 
widespread discontent among workers are forcefully advanc 
ed, along with sweeping promises of newly designed jobs 
which would heighten satisfaction within the workforce. In 
the eyes of work reform advocates, modern workers seek a 
wide array of challenges and rewards in their jobs, and 
employers have considerable latitude in redesigning jobs to 
meet these emerging needs. It is an appealingly optimistic vi 
sion, but one that may overestimate both our character and 
our capabilities.
When viewed collectively, contemporary discussions of 
work motivation and satisfaction present widely divergent 
visions of work's future, ranging from the catastrophic to 
the Utopian. These disparate accounts reflect the ample room 
for confusion created by rapid changes in labor force par 
ticipation, occupational structure, and technology during the
past few decades. Particularly when based on isolated 
trends, most sketches depicting the future of work shed more 
light on the hopes and fears of their authors than on the 
nature of tomorrow's workplace. Yet when labor market 
data are carefully examined in the context of broader social 
changes and market forces, a more coherent view of work in 
the 1990s and beyond emerges.
Chasing Expectations
The broad outlines of work's future will be shaped by the 
level of our expectations at the workplace and by our relative 
ability to respond to them. Although their influence reaches 
far beyond the labor market, current trends in wealth, 
education, and technology provide the driving forces behind 
the gradual evolution of work, raising expectations and set 
ting the limits within which we can hope to fulfill them. 
Because of their scope, these sweeping changes in American 
society are frequently overlooked or given scant attention in 
topical studies of the workplace. Yet it is this set of forces 
which will have the greatest role in defining the goals of 
tomorrow's worker, affecting both the motivation to work 
and the prospects for job satisfaction.
The most pervasive force behind rising expectations is the 
increasing wealth of American society. The trend toward af 
fluence is unmistakable: in the last three decades, the average 
American's spendable income has risen 87 percent, after 
allowing for inflation and higher federal income and payroll 
taxes. Thirty-five percent of all families had an income of 
$25,000 or better in 1979, compared to only 8 percent with 
real incomes that high a quarter of a century earlier. Cast in 
more vivid terms, Americans spent more on liquor alone in 
1981 than their grandparents and great-grandparents did on 
all goods and services a century ago. This unprecedented 
growth in real incomes has radically revised our lifestyles,
but more importantly it has lowered our tolerance for hard 
ship and led us to expect even further gains.
To the extent that economic necessity provides a prime 
motivation to work, increasing affluence has weakened the 
ties between workers and their jobs. In addition to swelling 
the ranks of the independently wealthy, rising incomes have 
made possible a host of transfer payments which give many 
others the option not to work. During the 1970s, a decade 
commonly associated with conservative climates, these 
transfer payments increased 77 percent in real terms an ex 
pansion of the welfare state without parallel. Most of these 
payments went to the retired, disabled and unemployed 
workers, and veterans, with less than one-fifth of the total 
devoted to "public assistance" provided on the basis of 
need. While the great majority of Americans still find it 
necessary to work, the evolution of the welfare state has 
softened the consequences of not working and provided new 
choices (such as early retirement) to those who do work.
The rising incomes and expectations of recent decades 
have had a mixed impact on work motivation. As burgeon 
ing transfer payments approach one-sixth of the nation's 
disposable income, and assuming real earnings resume their 
dominant upward course, Americans increasingly will be 
able to change jobs or reject work in response to rising ex 
pectations. At the same time, however, relative income ap 
pears to be much more relevant to work motivation than any 
absolute gains, so that individuals have strong incentives to 
keep working no matter what release from work they could 
have collectively reaped from productivity gains. Like the 
mechanical rabbit leading the greyhounds around the 
racetrack, goals have consistently stayed ahead of produc 
tivity. This alone will keep most of us tied to work in the 
decades ahead.
In the same manner that rising affluence has led us to ex 
pect steadily growing incomes, rising levels of educational at-
tainment have caused us to expect greater challenges and 
skill requirements in our jobs. Again, the data reflect un 
questionable gains in education: In the three decades follow 
ing 1950, the proportion of the adult population that com 
pleted four years of high school almost doubled, jumping 
from 34.3 percent to 67 percent. Half of American workers 
had at least a whiff of college education (12.7 years of 
schooling) by 1980, four more years than attained by the 
average worker in 1940 when half the labor force had barely 
completed elementary school. In virtually all occupational 
categories, Americans are entering the labor force later and 
with more educational background than ever before, 
creating both opportunities and strains at the modern 
workplace.
If a few added years of history and algebra represented the 
full scope of educational expansion, the impact on worker 
expectations might be rather limited. Yet these extensions of 
formal education have been accentuated by a veritable "in 
formation explosion" which has raised the gazes of even the 
most isolated Americans far beyond their immediate sur 
roundings. Unlike the closed world of our grand 
parents without radio, television, and often even 
newspapers in which values and aspirations changed slow 
ly, we are now more aware of the lives which others enjoy. 
With this greater awareness, "overeducated" workers are 
more likely to be unhappy in their jobs or even to reject the 
work which society requires for its maintenance. The educa 
tional gains do create the possibility of more demanding 
work roles, but the failure of skill requirements to keep pace 
with educational improvements is likely to leave workers 
less, rather than more, satisfied with their jobs.
Finally, as changes in relative wealth and access to infor 
mation raise expectations, changes in technology will dictate 
the extent to which we can respond to new demands at the 
workplace. Technological advances have broadened occupa-
tional choices for some, freeing women from housekeeping 
chores and transforming the world into a much smaller place 
through innovations in transportation and communications. 
For other segments of the workforce, technological change is 
a more ominous force, eliminating skilled jobs and displac 
ing workers in declining manufacturing industries. The 
development of new technologies does not lead in a single 
direction in the formation of tomorrow's workplace, but it 
does present a set of real constraints too often overlooked by 
those who would reshape work to meet rising expectations.
Any one of these broad social changes, when viewed in 
isolation, can be used as the basis for extreme predictions 
regarding the future of work. Increasing wealth has been 
linked to both the demise of work and as the key to expand 
ing occupational choice and worker satisfaction. Added 
education and greater awareness lead some to project revolu 
tions at the workplace while causing others to hope for an 
era of increasingly skilled and challenging work roles. 
Technology may render workers obsolete, or simply 
eliminate the most harsh and unrewarding jobs while open 
ing new work opportunities. In all areas, the changes are so 
broad as to create endless possibilities for their selective ap 
plication, but such prophecies are myopic and misleading. 
Only when viewed together and assessed with the guidance of
current labor market data is it possible to construct a 
coherent picture of the future of work in a rapidly changing 
society.
The Commitment to Work
The dangers of extrapolating disparate trends are most 
clearly demonstrated by predictions that work will disap 
pear. Although the vision of a society in which many are 
freed from work is not illogical, current work patterns do 
not support such claims, but reflect great continuity with the 
work habits of our predecessors. The length of the full-time 
workweek, which steadily decreased during the first four 
decades of this century, has stabilized at a nearly universal 
40-hour week since World War II. More surprisingly, the 
proportion of the population that works has actually increas 
ed during this century, bolstered by growing labor force par 
ticipation among women. Even recent survey results confirm 
a continuing attachment to work a Roper Organization 
survey found that only one in five people place more em 
phasis on their personal satisfaction and pleasure than on 
working hard and doing a good job, 6 and 85 percent of those 
interviewed by the American Council of Life Insurance 
believe that success in life is dependent on their working 
hard. 7 If we are really about to abandon work, somebody 
had better tell the workers.
Rising levels of affluence among American workers have 
had an effect on work trends today's jobholders are in 
creasingly opting for greater leisure through paid vacations 
and holidays, and they are also spending fewer years of their 
lives working than ever before, retiring earlier in spite of 
growing life spans. Yet any expectations of freedom from 
work have been matched by expectations of higher incomes, 
limiting the scope of movements away from work. Rather 
than shunning their jobs, Americans have responded to ris 
ing productivity and affluence partially by seeking higher in-
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comes and partially by enjoying more "free time" while 
employed. These choices reflect somewhat predictable 
market decisions regarding the marginal utility of additional 
income and leisure, and such work-leisure tradeoffs can be 
expected to continue in the years ahead.
The economic incentives to work will not dissipate for the 
great majority of workers in the foreseeable future, and even 
this unlikely event would not lead to a workless society. 
Work fulfills a variety of needs in modern societies, pro 
viding not only an income but a sense of identity, of com 
munity and of purpose. Already we call many activities free 
ly chosen by individuals "work," and as we move further 
away from the effort to clothe and feed ourselves, our 
understanding of the nature of work will continue to change. 
Feudal lords would probably not have viewed many of our 
contemporary pursuits as work, but according to a modern 
definition we will continue to work nonetheless.
work (wurk), n. [ME. werk; AS. were, weorc; akin to G. 
werk; IE. base *werg-, to do, act, seen also in Gr. ergon 
(for *wergon), action, work (cf. ERG), organon, tool, 
instrument (cf. ORGAN)], 1. bodily or mental effort 
exerted to do or make something; purposeful activity; 
labor; toil. 2. employment: as, out of work. 3. occupa 
tion; business; trade; craft; profession: as, his work is 
selling. 4. a) something one is making, doing, or acting 
upon, especially as one's occupation or duty; task: 
undertaking: as, he laid out his work. 6) the amount of 
this: as, a day's work. 5. something that has been made 
or done; result of effort or activity; specifically, a) 
usually pi. an act; deed: as, a person of good works. 
6) pi. collected writings: as, the works of Whitman. 
c) pi. engineering structures, as bridges, dams, docks,
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Satisfaction at the Workplace
The continuing willingness of Americans to work is no 
guarantee of their satisfaction at the workplace. Workers 
may reluctantly conclude that unrewarding jobs are 
preferable to no jobs at all, but the potential for worker 
discontent remains a legitimate source of concern. At the 
same time, if claims of widespread dissatisfaction at the 
workplace are to become mandates for public or private 
remedies, the burden of proof must lie with the critics of 
work. Thus far, their case has not been convincing.
Efforts to gauge worker dissatisfaction and identify shifts 
in such attitudes over time pose numerous research prob 
lems. Surveys which attempt to assess worker discontent are 
plagued by methodological shortcomings, with results vary 
ing widely depending on how survey questions are phrased 
and responses collected and interpreted. Because work is so 
closely associated with one's identity and self-esteem, 
measures of work satisfaction invariably provoke defensive 
reactions which preserve one's self-image and dignity. 
Hence, workers are found to be generally satisfied with their 
jobs, but also to feel underutilized and inadequately 
challenged by their work roles. Without admitting that they 
have "settled" for unsatisfying jobs, respondents react to 
specific questions of work quality by criticizing the con 
straints inherent in their roles and thereby preserving their 
sense of self-esteem.
As difficult as it is to develop meaningful measures of 
worker satisfaction, it is even harder to construct defensible 
claims of long term changes in worker attitudes. While 
sizable portions of the workforce are no doubt (and 
justifiably) unhappy with their jobs, we have little basis for 
comparing this level of dissatisfaction with that of prior 
generations. The few available longitudinal studies on work 
satisfaction have encountered difficulties in distinguishing
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attitude changes of workers as they grow older from broader 
societal shifts over time. For this reason, we may believe that 
worker discontent is sufficiently prevalent to warrant public 
attention and concern, but calls for remedial action based on 
the claims that dissatisfaction is spreading and work quality 
deteriorating are sorely lacking empirical support.
Looking at the occupational shifts already underway in 
the labor market, it seems impossible to predict whether the 
prospects for satisfaction at the workplace will improve or 
diminish in the foreseeable future. The well-worn generaliza 
tions concerning shifts from blue-collar to white-collar and 
from manufacturing to service roles identify the broad direc 
tions of occupational change, but these observations reveal 
surprisingly little about the future quality of work. White- 
collar or service jobs will not necessarily be better or more 
rewarding than those which they replace, and much will de 
pend on the expectations which tomorrow's workers bring to 
these new jobs. The most certain and significant wariables in 
the satisfaction of future generations are the continuing 
gains in education and awareness among workers, which 
may lead to deeper concerns for work quality within the 
ranks of both labor and management. Revolution at the 
workplace still seems most unlikely, but a gradual evolution 
of priorities at work could have an important effect on the 
nature of jobs in decades to come.
The Attempt to Reform Work
Most discussions of work reform stem from a belief that 
much of today's work is unacceptably bleak and unreward 
ing. Such judgments are inherently subjective, and run the 
risk of underestimating the full diversity of worker interests 
and needs which shape expectations and attitudes on the job. 
Nevertheless, there remains a humanitarian quality to work 
reform efforts which justifies their pursuit even in the 
absence of impending crises. Where the potential for im-
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proving the organization and design of work exists within the 
bounds of technological and economic constraints, no threat 
of uprising should be necessary to ensure work reform in 
itiatives.
The accumulating literature on work reform first focus 
ing on costly job redesign schemes and more recently on 
broad issues of participative management has served a 
useful purpose. Advocates of work reform have succeeded in 
calling the attention of managers to the costs of excessive 
specialization and to the potential for tapping the knowledge 
of workers. Another byproduct of the work reform debate 
has been the occasional readiness of managers to reconsider 
the importance of worker commitment and morale as a 
"human variable" in analyses of production efficiency. 
Although the wholesale revision of work organizations has 
rarely been attempted, the critics of work have at least 
temporarily alerted some management and labor represen 
tatives to unattended problems in the workplace. The extent 
to which reform advocates can sustain that interest and 
actually change established practices remains to be seen.
Because they have tended to overstate their case, pro 
ponents of work reform are likely to encounter considerable 
skepticism in the years ahead. Concentrating on visions of 
meaningful work and rhetoric about the elimination of 
"dehumanizing" jobs, advocates of "work enrichment" 
and job redesign have failed to heed the technological con 
straints and economic considerations which establish the 
limits of potential work reform. They paid scant attention to 
questions of who will bear the costs of reforming work and 
what incentives managements will have to do so. Further 
more, specialized functions in work organizations were 
treated as though they were developed on a wholly irrational 
basis; Adam Smith's famous observations on the effect of a 
division of labor in the manufacture of pins are somehow
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forgotten. 8 Assuming that reform initiatives are designed to 
be implemented voluntarily in a manner consistent with 
market forces, their prospects for adoption seem far more 
limited than advocates suggest.
It is appealing to imagine a world in which there are no 
losers, in which both labor and management benefit by new 
approaches to work design and management. Under this 
scenario, workers would enjoy new challenges and accept 
greater responsibility in their jobs, heightening prospects for 
self-fulfillment at the workplace. Similarly, managers would 
be compensated for the time and effort they devoted to work 
reform by the increased productivity of a more satisfied 
workforce. Yet such anticipations assume an overriding 
community of interest between labor and management far 
different from the adversarial roles which have characterized 
American labor-management relations. While hard times 
may spur brief periods of reconciliation and cooperation be 
tween employers and their workers, such spells are not likely 
to be long-lived.
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Redesigned jobs or participative management efforts may 
serve as good public relations props, but private firms can 
not be expected to spend money for the sole purpose of 
enhancing worker satisfaction. While cooperation may be 
possible on narrowly-defined projects of limited duration, 
the commitment of management to work reform ex 
periments will last only as long as they generate tangible 
returns in improved product quality and higher profits. And 
if workers perceive reform initiatives as giving management 
higher profits while they get far less tangible rewards, even 
labor support for such experiments may be shortlived.
Dramatic improvements in work quality with worker 
satisfaction given priority over productivity and pro 
fits will be achieved only through the traditional adver 
sarial mechanisms of labor-management relations, won as 
workers' rights in the same manner as higher pay, safer 
working conditions, and restrictive work rules. To date, 
organized labor has not been willing to push work quality 
issues in collective bargaining, at least in part because the 
rank and file are not prepared to trade pay and benefits for 
less tangible or known rewards. As the education and expec 
tations of workers continue to rise, however, unions may ex 
tend their agenda to include these issues, thereby ensuring a 
more lasting and determined move toward satisfying work in 
the years ahead.
The Future
In rejecting more dramatic claims of a disintegrating work 
ethic or of workplaces redesigned along Utopian lines, the 
picture of the future which remains is more one of gradual 
change than of radical departures from work as we know it 
today. Americans will continue to work, although more and 
more will enjoy the benefits of leisure through longer vaca 
tions, added paid holidays, and more part-time employment. 
Menial and unrewarding jobs will persist, although the in-
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cumbents will increasingly wear a white collar or perform 
their work in service roles as opposed to the classic 
stereotypes of harsh factory work. Consultants will envision 
better worlds using values and priorities we all might em 
brace, but in the absence of sharp political and economic 
upheavals the technological and economic forces of the 
marketplace will continue to dictate the organization and 
design of work.
There are a number of encouraging trends to be found in 
current work patterns. Growing segments of the workforce 
will enjoy freedom of choice in work, selecting their prefer 
red occupations and switching jobs with relative ease. 
Leisure gains will allow individuals unprecedented control 
over their lives, enabling them to pursue their interests out 
side of work as well as selecting the work they will do on the 
job. There is even some hope that the needs and motivation 
of workers will be given additional attention in the coming 
decades, as human resources are reassessed for their poten 
tial contributions to economic growth.
This relatively bright outlook of the future of work is 
clouded by the awareness that not all segments of the labor 
force will share its fruits. Amidst disturbing signs of a widen 
ing gap between the most and least fortunate workers, the 
danger to American society is that increasing numbers of 
workers will be excluded from productive work or confined 
to menial and unrewarding jobs. The pace of technological 
change threatens to displace growing numbers of workers in 
declining manufacturing sectors, and the expansion of skill 
ed employment will be of little consolation to the uneducated 
with limited or narrow skills. The challenge for public policy 
in the labor market will be to minimize these disparities in 
work experience, and to ensure that opportunities are of 
fered for those left behind to partake in a society of growing 
affluence, freedom and leisure at work.
